Effects of Maritime Illegal Oil Trading on Economic Growth in Nigeria by Igbogi, Elei Green & Njoku, Ikpechukwu
Developing Country Studies                                                                                                                                                              www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2224-607X (Paper) ISSN 2225-0565 (Online) 
Vol.5, No.12, 2015 
 
31 
Effects of Maritime Illegal Oil Trading on Economic Growth in 
Nigeria 
 
Elei Green Igbogi
1
      Ikpechukwu Njoku
2*
 
1. Nigerian Maritime Administration and Safety Agency, 4 Burma Road, Apapa Lagos, Nigeria 
2. Department of Transport Management Technology, Federal University of Technology Akure, Ondo State, 
Nigeria 
*
E-mail of the corresponding author: ikpechinjoku@yahoo.com 
 
Abstract 
Illegal oil trading involves the theft of crude oil and its derivative products through a variety of different 
mechanisms with significant economic implications. This study therefore, investigates these implications 
covering the period of 1995-2012. Employing the e-views econometric software, the unit root, co-integration, 
and granger causality tests were carried out on the secondary data set to make it amenable to the application of 
the vector autoregressive (VAR) modeling of the ordinary least square multiple regression to reveal among 
others, that a significant relationship exists between the illegal oil trading and the economic growth in Nigeria. 
Other findings are that the volume of oil theft as an explanatory variable met the a priori expectation with its 
negative coefficient, but together with the one-year lagged variables of the dependent variables, was statistically 
significant in terms of contributions to the dependent variable. The study concludes that illegal oil trading has 
negative effects on the Nigerian economy, especially within the study period and should be checked by the law 
enforcement authorities. Prominent among the recommendations is the need to institute adequate and effective 
sanctions against offenders to serve as a deterrent. 
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1. Introduction 
This work provides an overview of oil theft problem in Nigeria maritime domain and distinguishes between local 
small scale oil theft for the domestic market and the larger scale oil theft involving transport by sea-going 
tankers to international destinations. It mentioned how much is stolen, associated effect and potential solutions. 
Oil displaced agriculture from its top revenue yielding position barely a decade after independence to the point 
of now accounting for over 85% of national revenue and 90% of foreign exchange earnings (Garuba, 2006 and 
2010). This sudden descend of the country into the class of rentier states, dubbed as such by its virtual position 
as mere collector of rents from multinational companies, points to the linkage between oil and state and the basis 
for which the latter has become a contested terrain, as well as the chief mediator of the various social processes 
and clearages within the system. The observed leakages in Nigeria’s case confirms the thesis by Chazan, et al 
(1992) that a state’s capacity to secure full control over its people and resources is dependent on the reality of the 
concrete interests it reflects and manages. It is in this context that illegal oil trading (seeks an understanding) is 
premised on the constitutional provision that the ownership and control of all minerals and mineral oil, in, under 
and upon any land, and of rivers, streams and watercourses in Nigeria are vested in the Federal Government (see 
Section 44(3) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria as originated in the 1946 Mineral 
Ordinance). 
The upsurge noticed in contemporary illegal oil trading started attracting public knowledge in1993 
when crude oil and its refined products (specifically petrol) became the domain of senior military officers and 
their civilian cronies. From the initial opportunity provided by domestic subsidy and devaluation of the Nigeria 
Naira during which legally lifted products were diverted to more profitable markets of Communaute financiere 
africaine (CFA) Franc States under arrangement and cover of government officials, illegal oil trading in Nigeria 
took firm roots with the discrete cooperation of oil companies’ workers who operated at oil wellheads or allowed 
access to them. The bunkerers tap directly into pipelines away from oil company facilities and connect from the 
pipelines to barges that are hidden in small creeks with mangrove forest cover. The scramble for illegal money 
accruable from this business grew alarmingly among top military brass who became increasingly preoccupied 
with bolstering their assets and securing perks for the middle ranks in anticipation of disengagement from 
service (Lewis, 1999 and 2007).  
The business whose trans-border character soon expanded beyond Franc states of West Africa and 
Cameroon kept a rising tempo with operational sophistication and dexterity that make the competence of 
Nigeria’s police and navy pale into insignificance; though they are often fingered as accomplices. The business 
of oil bunkering is as opaque and murky as the many gaps in analysts’ knowledge of its operations (Asuni, 2009). 
However, Asuni (2009) also reveals three major ways oil theft is carried out: 
 (1) A minor and small-scale pilfering of condensate and petroleum product destined local market; 
 (2) Direct hacking into pipelines or tapping with a hose from wellhead through practical removal of the 
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‘Christmas tree’ 
 (3) Excess lifting of crude oil beyond the licensed amount, using forged bills of lading.  
While the first is less significant in that it is conducted by local people who hide under the cover of violence in 
the Niger Delta region, the second category brings more technical sophistication into the business with the stolen 
product placed in small barges and taken straight into the sea where it is loaded into larger barges (mother ships) 
in return for money and weapons used to fuel violence, while the last category speaks solely about a spoilt 
system facilitated by official corruption in that it involves the use of forged bills of lading, issued by a carrier to 
a shipper, listing and acknowledging receipt of goods for transport and specifying terms of delivery (Asuni, 
2009).  
Oil theft has considerable economic, social, environmental, governance and security implications. This 
criminal act has contributed significantly to the poverty and degradation that exist in the Niger Delta region of 
Nigeria today. The issue of oil theft in the Niger Delta has been a problem for a long time but considered by 
many as tolerable. However, today there is a clear recognition from the Nigeria Government that this illegal 
practice is now having a direct negative impact on the entire economy (Garuba, 2010). Large-scale illegal oil 
bunkering has become an increasingly significant issue in recent years. The violence in Niger Delta is predicated 
on the activities of an illegal oil stolen syndicate that collaborates with foreigners to fuel the civil unrest with a 
view to creating opportunity to enable them to engage in their illicit oil deals in the creeks. Another negative 
impact of Illegal oil bunkering is environmental damage. The social and environmental costs of oil theft have 
been very extensive. They include destruction of wildlife and biodiversity, loss of fertile soil, pollution of and 
drinking water, degradation of farmland and damage to aquatic ecosystems, all of which have caused serious 
health problems for the inhabitants of areas surrounding illicit trade (Garuba, 2010). The objectives of this study 
are to determine the influence of maritime illegal oil trading on economic growth in Nigeria and to raise 
prediction models on the relationship between the maritime illegal oil trading and economic development in 
Nigeria.  
 
2. Methodology 
2.1 Sources of Data 
Secondary data were used in the analysis and were sourced from the publications of the Central Bank of Nigeria, 
National Planning Office, National Bureau for Statistics, Nigeria National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) and 
Nigerian maritime administration and safety agency (NIMASSA). 
 
2.2 Methods of Data Analysis 
The data set were analyzed using two approaches: 
• Descriptive Statistics and 
• Inferential Statistics 
While the inferential statistics were employed to analyse the formulated hypothesis other objectives of the study 
were however, met with the use of descriptive statistics. 
2.2.1 Test of Hypothesis 
The formulated hypothesis was tested with a linear regression model with ordinary least square properties. 
Hence, a multiple regression approach was adopted. The economic analysis involved model specification and 
testing of the hypothesis. For the hypothesis, Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was made the dependent variable. 
2.2.2 Test Statistics 
The time series data for the period, 1995-2012, were fitted into the linear function. This was to enable us predict 
the level of the dependent variable GDP that can be achieved given known levels of the illegal oil trading 
explanatory variables. The test statistics therefore, include the Coefficient of Correlation (R), Coefficient of 
Determination (R
2
), the analysis of variance (ANOVA/F-ratio) and the t-distribution (t-Test). While the 
ANOVA/F-test establishes the significance of the model as a whole, the coefficient of correlation seeks to test 
the magnitude of the relationship between the dependent variable and the components of maritime illegal oil 
trading as explanatory variables. The t-Test seeks to test the level of significance of the maritime illegal oil 
trading explanatory variables to the dependent variable. 
2.2.3 Test of the Model Significance:  
The first test carried out under the hypothesis testing was a test of the model significance. This seeks to test for 
the significance of the model as a whole. There are two ways to accomplish this; the analysis of variance or the 
coefficient of determination, R
2
. 
2.2.3.1 The Analysis of Variance Approach 
This statistical tool aims to split the variations of a variable, for example, in the hypothesis, GDP regressand with 
its component parts, variations in the dependent variable GDP, that are accounted for by the explanatory 
variables (maritime illegal oil trading variables), regressors, that is, the different sources of growth in the GDP as 
produced by the maritime illegal oil trading components; are called the EXPLAINED VARIATIONS. Other 
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sources not thus explained are due to random or chance factors. These are estimates of the population 
disturbance variable ‘u’ and are represented by ‘e’, otherwise referred to as the RESIDUALS or error term.  
                                                              
Table 1. A Hypothetical ANOVA Table 
Source of 
Variation 
Sum of Squares  Degree of 
Freedom  
Mean Square of 
Error 
F-Statistic 
Regression   	 K-1 

K  1 
MS ΣESS 
MS ΣRSS 
Residual   	


 
 
N-k 

   
F-Tabulated 
Total 
Variation 
	


 	 
 
N-1 
 Decision:  
if Fcal>Ftab reject Ho and 
Accept Ha 
 
For the hypothesis, the regression equation is presented thus; 
GDP	  β" # β$ # %& # %' # u …………………………… .1 
 
2.2.3.2 The Coefficient of Determination, R
2
 Approach 
Another way to test for the model significance is through the coefficient of determination (R
2
). The R
2
 is 
calculated from the regression and it gives the proportion of the total variation in the dependent variable, actual 
cargo throughput factor that is explained by the independent variables, here the various maritime illegal oil 
trading components. R
2
, from the sample is a statistical estimate of the population, e
2
, (row squared). The value 
of R
2
 ranges between 0 and 1; 
In setting up the test the following hypothesis is tested; 
HO1:ρ
2
 = O          i.e., the regressors, the growth in the maritime illegal oil trading  components, or sources of 
growth in the cargo throughput factor, in a given year have no significant relationship with the 
actual growth of the cargo throughput factor for that year. 
HA1ρ
2 
> O        (One-tailed test of significance) i.e., at least, there is a significant relationship between one of the 
independent variables and the actual growth of the cargo throughput factor. 
2.2.3.3 Decision Rule 
If F-ratio calculated is greater than the F-ratio tabulated or theoretical F, at alpha (α) – level of significance, and 
(K-1), (N-K), degrees of freedom, then we Reject H0 and Accept HA, and thus state that there is some truth in 
the estimated model (i.e. the regression model is significant since the regressors significantly account for the 
variation in the dependent variable (GDP	)  
Here, F	calculated	  
  ⁄
1  
N K
…………………………2 
2.2.4 Test of Significance of the Explanatory Variables, t-Test 
Having established the significance of the estimated model as a whole next is to test the specific strengths of the 
various regressors in bringing about this result. This is carried out through the test on the estimated parameters of 
the regressors. The test-statistics or student t-test is calculated as follows; 
t– Test  ;<Se;<	 for	K	  	1  	6…………………………3 
Where; 
βk = Estimate of the population parameters for the regressors (i.e. maritime illegal oil trading components) 
Se(βk) = Standard error of the estimate 
2.2.4.1 Decision Rule 
If	absolute	value	or	 E FGHIFG	E J tn  k		at	
α
M level of significance, we Reject H0 and Accept HA: to conclude that 
the variable belongs significantly to the model. 
2.3 Model Specification  
The dependent variable represented by the symbol GDP	  is regressed on the various components of maritime 
illegal oil trading components figures for the corresponding period. These components of maritime illegal oil 
trading are hereby represented as follows: 
VASt =     Total value of stolen oil in year t; 
VOSt =     Total volume of stolen oil in year t; 
The dependent variable, however, is as specified: GDP	    =     Level of cargo throughput in year t;   
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2.4 Data Estimation 
Here, we note that the data set was estimated by carrying out the following tests; unit root, co-integration and 
granger causality tests. While the unit root test sought to test for the stationarity of the data set not to produce 
spurious results, the informational content of the model were confirmed by the use of the co-integration test 
which helped to establish the nature of the model, whether short- or long-run relationships existed among the 
variables of the model. Finally, with the granger causality test, the direction of the effects was thus established. 
 
3.0 Data Presentation and Analysis 
Table 2. Volume of Stolen Oil, Value of Stolen Oil and GDP 
S/N YEAR VOS VAS GDP 
1 1995 229565000 91.76 1933211.6 
2 1996 230031800 111.74 2702719.1 
3 1997 257947000 107.56 2801972.6 
4 1998 249207600 76.26 2708430.9 
5 1999 257791600 105.13 3194015 
6 2000 242350000 357.68 4582127.3 
7 2001 337322415 821.7 4725086 
8 2002 390463495 1079.1 6912381.3 
9 2003 237250000 786.6 8487031.6 
10 2004 193450000 812.8 11411067 
11 2005 156950000 1161.6 14572239 
12 2006 255500000 2240.6 18564595 
13 2007 255500000 2304 20657318 
14 2008 292000000 4056 24296329 
15 2009 694925910 6655.5 24794239 
16 2010 283078530 3525 33984754 
17 2011 386091290 6975 37543655 
18 2012 179514150 3239.5 39650864 
Source: NIMASSA, CBN, Various Years 
 
3.1 Data Estimation 
In this section, our objective is to establish the stationarity of the entire data set employed in the estimation. 
When a particular data set is found to be stationary, it then suffices that the data set can be relied upon for the 
estimation, having eliminated the possibility of spurious results. 
Table 3. Unit Root Test for the Variables Employed. 
 Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Test 
Variable T-statistic. Critical value Order of Integration Significance 
VOS -3.527962 -3.052169 1(0) 5% 
VAS -8.649341 -3.920350 1(1) 5% 
GDP -3.287799 -3.065585 1(1) 5% 
Source: E-views 6.0 Econometric Package 
 
3.2 Unit Root Test Result 
The unit root test was carried out using the Augmented Dickey Fuller test in order to determine whether the data 
set was stationary and the order of integration. It could be observed from Table 3 that only the volume of oil was 
stationary at level. Other variables turned out to be stationary at first difference. Generally, the data set can be 
relied upon for analysis as it shows no evidence of producing spurious results. 
    
3.3 The Co-integration Result 
Having established the stationarity of the data set, the Johansen co-integration test was applied, which adopts no 
exogenous variables as it is based on the vector auto regression (VAR) modeling. Here, we try to establish the 
presence of a short or long-run equilibrium existing between the variables and hence the estimated regression 
equation results. This result is as presented in Table 4. 
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Table 4. Co-integration and Test Results 
 Johanssen Co-integration Test 
 
Model 
 Number of Co-integrating 
Equations 
Nature of  
Equilibrium 
1 Maritime Illegal Oil Trading and Cargo Throughput  1 Long-run 
Source: E views 6.0 Econometric Package 
In Table 4, model 1 shows evidence no co-integrating equation and a short-run relationship   
 
3.4 The Granger Causality Result 
The result here does indicate that most of the pair of variables has not, in fact, produced significant causal effects. 
In other words, the pair of variables failed to produce any noticeable significant causal effects.  
 
3.5 Hypothesis Testing 
3.5.1 The Influence Of Illegal Oil Trading On Economic Growth  
Here, one lead equation is to be estimated and the hypothesis states as follows: 
HO: There is no significant relationship between the level of Maritime Illegal Oil Trading and 
Economic Growth in Nigeria. 
The sub-hypotheses from HO are as follows; 
HOa: The value of Maritime Illegal Oil Trading has no significant effect on the level of Economic 
Growth in Nigeria. 
HOb: The volume of Maritime Illegal Oil Trading has no significant effect on the level of Economic 
Growth in Nigeria. 
 
Table 5. Results of the Global Statistics for the Influence of Illegal Oil Trading On Nigeria Economic 
Growth 
Test-Statistic 
 
Model  
Least Square 
R-square 0.902 
Adjusted R-square 0.889 
S.E of Regression 4269296 
Sum of squared residual 2.73E+14 
Log likelihood -298.7053 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.457565 
Mean dependent Variable 14640113 
S.D. dependent Variable 12827473 
Akaike info criterion 33.52 
Schwarz criterion 33.67 
Hannan-Quinn criterion 33.54 
F-statistic 69.23413 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.00000 
NB:*** = significant at 1%; ** = significant at 5%; * = Not significant. F-ratio tabulated DF (2, 15); 1% = 6.36, 
5% = 3.68, t-ratio DF (15); 1% = 2.95, 5% = 2.13. 
Source: Eviews 6. Statistical Package 
3.5.2 Test of Model Significance – ANOVA.  
In order to confirm the specification status of our model, we employed the ANOVA. 
3.5.3 Decision Rule  
Employing the E-views software, since the F–ratio calculated (69.23413) > F–ratio critical (6.36, 3.68), at both 1% 
and 5% levels of significance respectively, we reject H0 and conclude that there is a significant relationship 
between the level of maritime illegal oil trading and economic growth in Nigeria. The estimated regression result 
is presented thus;  
GDP	  17991587 # 7067.458%&  0.059312%' …………………………… .4 
 
3.6 The Impact of Maritime Illegal Oil Trading On Economic Growth in Nigeria (Test of Sub-Hypotheses)  
The sub-hypotheses from HO are as follows; 
HOa: The value of Maritime Illegal Oil Trading has no significant effect on the level of Economic 
Growth in Nigeria. 
HOb: The volume of Maritime Illegal Oil Trading has no significant effect on the level of Economic 
Growth in Nigeria. 
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Having tested the significance of the model, we go a step further to test the significance of the maritime illegal 
oil trading in contributing to the total variation in the level of economic growth in Nigeria. This is achieved 
through the student t-test. We refer to the regression result in Table 6 wherein, both the value and volume of 
illegal oil trading were statistically significant since the t-ratio calculated (11.45, 5.26) > t-ratio critical (2.95, 
2.13) at both 1% and 5% levels of significance, respectively. 
Table 6. T-Statistic Table-Effect on Economic Growth 
NB:***=significant at 1%;**=significant at 5%;*=Not significant. T-ratio DF (15); 1%=2.95, 5% =2.13 
                       Source: E-views 6.0 Statistical Package.  
  
4.0 The Maritime Illegal Oil Trading and Economic Growth 
This section is on the relationship between maritime illegal oil trading and the level of economic growth. This 
result revealed that a significant relationship actually exists between maritime illegal oil trading and level of 
economic growth in Nigeria. In addition, both the value and volumes of maritime illegal oil trading were to be 
statistically significant even at 1% level of significance. However, only the volume of maritime illegal oil trading 
carried the correct sign. In the same vein, the model, with an R-squared of 90% has shown that the changes in 
the explanatory variables taken together have been able to explain at least, 77% of the total variations in the 
dependent variable, port revenue, thus, leaving only about 23% to chance occurrence. The estimated regression 
result is presented thus; 
GDP	  17991587 # 7067.458%& # 0.059312%' …………………………… .4 
From equation 4, while the volume of cargoes pilfered, with its negative coefficient, met the a priori expectation, 
the number of global and local attacks on ships failed to meet the a priori expectation, bearing positive 
coefficients. 
 
5. Summary of Findings 
From the objective standpoint, the study made the following findings; 
1. That a significant relationship exists between the maritime illegal oil trading and economic growth in 
Nigeria. 
2. That only the volume of maritime illegal oil trading met the a priori expectation with its negative 
coefficient and effect on economic growth in Nigeria. 
3. That only the one-year lagged variable of the gross domestic product exerted a significant effect on the 
level of economic growth in Nigeria. 
 
5.1 Conclusion  
On the basis of our findings, the study therefore concludes that generally, maritime illegal oil trading has 
affected the economy negatively and that the volume of illegal oil trading is high and as such deals a devastating 
effect on the economy in general. 
 
5.2 Recommendations 
There is need for the maritime authorities to step up the fight against illegal oil trading in the country. In effect, 
there should be adequate and effective sanctions for offenders to serve as a deterrent. Following from this 
recommendation, the study still recommends that there should be proper legal framework to persecute culprits 
involved in illegal oil trading. The practice of selective treatment for offenders should be stopped since our 
constitution states that all individuals are equal before the law. Also, the authorities should as well learn to adopt 
some of the modern ways of tracking the stolen oil like the finger printing method and satellite imaging. With 
this, it will be possible to track any stolen oil by forensic experts. 
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